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111. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellant Warren Yadon, (hereinafter "Warren Yadon") and Respondent 
Kim Yadon were husband and wife at the time of this transaction. Together they 
purchased a piece of property known as "the Montgomery farim" in 1994, and held 
legal title to the property by warranty deed as husband and wife. Warren Yadon 
filed for divorce froin Kim Yadon in the spring of 2008, and the divorce was 
finalized on December 18, 2008. In August of 2008, Kiln Yadon's parents 
George and JoAnn Kelley (hereinafter "the Kelleys") filed a lawsuit against 
Warren and Kiln Yadon claiming an ownership interest in the Montgolnery farin 
by constructive or resulting trust. 
B. Course of Proceedinr~s 
The Kelleys filed a Complaint against Warren and Kim Yadon on August 
25,2008. R. Vol. I ,  pg. 22. At the time, Warren Yadon had just filed for divorce 
fi-om Kiln Yadon. Warren Yadon fifed an Answer and Counter Petition for 
eviction on September 8, 2008. R. Vol. 1, pg. 36. Warren Yadon filed a motion 
for summary judgment on December 29,2008, requesting that the trial court find 
--^.--rkL^-."l_l--.-~ll~.l-l--"l.-.+.l-lb..- .. .- . .-I ll.-,..l...I-._, ' .--. ^ ...-.....---.-~+ _ __.̂ __,̂ ....-I,- ~ _ I__,̂ __.-.̂  _I,_____--_ -_--- __  
that there was no genuine issue of fact on Kelleys' theories of constructive trust 
and resulting trust. R. Vol. I., pg. 125. The Kelleys filed a memorandum in 
opposition to summary judgment on January 15,2009. R. Vol. I., pg. 212. The 
Kelleys did not file an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment, and instead 
stipulated to rely upon deposition excerpts quoted in their memorandum in 
opposition. Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 14,ll. 10-25, pg. 15,ll. 1-3. The trial court called up 
Warren Yadon's motion for summary judgment for hearing on February 5,2009, 
accepted oral argument on the motion for summary judgment and took the matter 
under advisement. R. Vol. 2, pg. 244. On February 12, 2009, the trial court 
issued its Memorandum Decision Denying Warren Yadon's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. R. Vol. 2, 245. 
This matter then came up for bench trial on March 30,2009. Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 
55, 11. 1-5. The trial court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
June 4, 2009, denying the Kelleys' claim under constructive trust but imposing a 
resulting trust in favor of the Kelleys. R. Vol. 2, pg. 39 1. Warren Yadon filed his 
notice of appeal to this Court on July 13, 2009. R. Vol. 2, pg. 447. 
C. Statement of Facts 
In 1990, plaintiff George Kelley testified that he negotiated with Esther 
Montgomery regarding the possibility of purchasing her farm, which is commonly 
known as the "Montgomery Farm." R. Vol. 2, pg. 392; Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 82, 11. 12- 
15. George Kelley testified that Esther Montgomery wanted cash for the farm, 
and that he didn't have the money so he went to Ray Commons for help. Ray 
4 
Commons agreed to purchase the Montgomery Farm, in his name, and give 
George Kelley an option to purchase. Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 83,ll. 8-15. George Kelley 
testified that he entered into a Fann Lease with Option to Purchase with 
Commons Farms. Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 84,ll. 15-25. 
George Kelley testified that in 1992, when the option to purchase was about 
to expire, he believed that he would not be able to get financing to exercise the 
option to purchase on the Montgomery Farm due to credit problems, Chapter 11 
bankruptcy, and IRS tax liens. Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 127,ll. 2-5. George Kelley testified 
that in 1992, he transferred his option to purchase the Montgomery farm to 
Warren and Kim Yadon. Tr. Vol 1, pg. 128, 11. 1-6. On the 4th day of March, 
1992, the Kelleys entered into an "Agreement Transferring Option to Purchase 
. - 
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to purchase, George Kelley testified that Warren and Kim Yadon assumed a 
$40,000.00 debt that Kelley owed to Doc Flanders. Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 129, 11. 4-5. 
Also on March 4, 1992, Warren and Kim Yadon entered into an agreement 
with Doc Flanders called a "Tenants-in-Common Agreement." R. Plaintiffs 
Exhibit "9". Under this agreement, the Yadons assigned their newly acquired 
"option to purchase" the Montgomery Farm to Doc Flanders so that Doc Flanders 
could purchase the property from Commons Farm, Inc. Id. Doc Flanders 
assumed the $117,000.00 loan taken out by Commons Farm, Inc. on the 
Montgomery Farm from Farm Credit Services. Id. 
As security, Doc Flanders retained a one-half interest in the Montgomery 
Farm and transferred the other one-half interest to the Yadons. R. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit "7". The Yadon's agreed that they would repay Doc Flanders the 
$1 17,000.00 plus nine (9%) interest as well as the $40,000.00 obligation described 
earlier, at which time Doc Flanders would give the Yadons the deed to his one- 
half interest in the Montgomery Farm. R. Plaintiff s Exhibit "9". Consequently, 
on March 4, 1992, the Yadons took a loan in their names and used the proceeds 
to buy a one-half interest in the property from Flanders, who gave them a 
- 
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In addition, a term of the "Tenants-In-Common Agreement" was that "the 
purpose of the land ownership is to generate income by leasing the same for 
farming operations andlor participating in agricultural CRP and set aside programs 
to the extent it is appropriate to do so." R. Plaintiff's Exhibit "9". George Kelley 
testified that he lcnew in 1992, that he had entered into a written lease agreement 
with Doc Flanders, and that he knew Warren and Kim Yadon were one-half 
owners of the Montgomery farm with Doc Flanders. Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 7-13; R. 
Plaintiffs Exhibits "3" and "4"; Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 139, 11. 5-1 1. 
On July 20, 1994, the Yadons toolc another loan and purchased Flanders' 
share in the farm, thereby becoming the sole title holders to the farm." R. Vol. 2, 
pg. 395; R. Plaintiffs Exhibit "10". Paul and Bethany Haynes issued a quitclaim 
deed for the Montgomery Farm to the Yadons, to clear title for the Northwest 
Farm Credit loan. R. Plaintiff's Exhibit "1 1". As a consequence, on August 4, 
1994, Doc Flanders issued a warranty deed to the Yadons transferring the 
remaining one-half interest in the Montgomery Farm to the Yadons. R. Plaintiffs 
Exhibit "12". Since that time, the trial court found that the Yadons have held sole 
legal title to the Montgomery Farm. R. Vol. 2, pg. 393. 
. 
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with D.L. Evans Bank, for $396,000.00, and granted a mortgage to D.L. Evans 
Bank. R. Plaintiff's Exhibit "16,". Since that time, the Yadons have been the sole 
legal title holders to the Montgomery farm. 
According to George Kelley, there was a meeting that took place at his 
attorney's office (Mr. Bill Parsons) in Burley, wherein, the conveyance to the 
Yadons was discussed. Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 153,ll. 14-25, pg. 154, 11. 1-18. George 
Kelley testified that Warren and Kim Yadon were present, along with Mr. Parsons 
and George Kelley, and that the parties discussed the purchase of the Montgomery 
farm. Id. George Kelley testified that at some point Warren Yadon left the room 
and Bill Parsons asked him, "are you okay with this, Kelley?' Id. George Kelley 
responded that he was okay with the situation. Id. 
George Kelley knew that the status in 1994, was that the Yadons were the 
two legal owners of the Montgomery Farm, and that George Kelley was going to 
pay the mortgage payments in exchange for continuing to operate the farm. Tr. 
Vol. 1, pg. 158, 11. 5-12. 
Since that time, the Kelleys have continued to operate the farm, and keep 
the profit off the farm. Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 157, 11. 2-7 and 24-25; pg. 15, 11. 1-2. 
However, even George Kelley testified that there were times when he did not 
-- 
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158, 11. 2 1-25. George Kelley admitted that it could have happened more than 
once, and that he doesn't have any idea how many times. Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 160,11. 
24-25; pg. 161,11. 1-4. Further, George Kelley testified that he repaid the Yadons 
for all of the payments he missed, but that it could have taken a few months to get 
around to it after he "sold some hay or something later on." Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 161, 
11. 16-24. The trial court found that indeed George Kelley was occasionally late 
making payments causing the Yadons to have to make a timely payment on their 
credit cards or through check protection. R. Vol. 2, pg. 397. 
Warren Yadon testified that the Kelleys did not contribute any money to the 
purchase price for the Montgoinery farm. Tr. Voi. 1, pg; 303,ll. 10-14; pg. 307, 
11. 19-25. The trial court found that in 2004 or 2005 Kim Yadon told her father 
that he needed to get the farm out of the Yadons' name, indicating that the 
Yadons' marriage was troubled. R. Vol. 2, pg. 397. The trial court found that 
Warren Yadon filed for divorce in May, 2008, and that the instant lawsuit was 
filed by the Kelleys in August, 2008. Id. 
After the lawsuit was filed, Warren Yadon served the Kelleys with a notice 
of eviction on September 8, 2008. R. Vol. 2, pg. 397. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
, . 
.._-._.I- .. .. 
"On appeal from the grant of a mot~on for summary judgment, this CouiY'ss---.'-"-''. 
standard of review is the same as the standard used by the district court originally 
ruling on the motion." Chapin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 162 P.3d 772, 774 
(2007). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
However, "a mere scintilla of evidence or slight doubt as to the facts" is not 
sufficient to create a genuine issue for purposes of summary judgment. Havpole 
v. State, 13 1 Idaho 437,439,958 P.2d 594,596 (1 998), Petricevich v. Salmon River 
Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,871,452 P.2d 362 (1969). The non-moving party "must 
respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing there is a 
genuine issue for trial." Tuttle v. Sudenga Industries, Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 150,868 
P.2d 473,478 (1994). It is well established that merely asserting the existence of 
a factual dispute will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. There must be 
a "genuine issue" and it must exist as to a "material fact." See Gavzee v. Barkley, 
121 Idaho, 771, 774, 828 P.2d 334,337 (Ct. App. 1992). 
A district court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly 
erroneous, although the appellate court exercises free review over conclusions of 
-- 
law. Carney v. Heinson, S33XFBIn0275 j 985PTZdn 37 '(1999);--"Clearerror"will--------.. 
not be deemed to exist if the court's findings are supported by substantial and 
competent, though conflicting, evidence. Muniz v. Schrader, 1 15 Idaho 497, 767 
P.2d 1272 (Ct.App.1989). The Supreme Court may substitute its view for that 
of the district court on a legal issue. Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 946 P.2d 
975 (1997). 
V. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in denying Warren Yadon's motion for 
summary judgment on the theory of resulting trust, when the Kelleys 
failed to establisl~ a genuine issue of fact on the element of payment 
of the purchase price? 
2.  Did the trial court misapply the law with regard to the elements of 
resulting trust, specifically, whether the Kelleys paid the purchase 
price or incurred an absolute obligation to pay the purchase price? 
3. Did the trial court err in finding that the Kelleys' had established the 
elements of resulting trust by clear and convincing evidence at trial? 
4. Did the trial court err in its application of the burden of proof at trial? 
5 ,  Did the trial court err in not granting Warren Yadon's claim for 
evictian? 
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VI. ARGUMENT 
With regard to the Kelleys' claiin of resulting trust, the trial court erred in 
two regards in the underlying proceedings in this matter. First, the trial court 
incorrectly applied the law and standard of review at the summary judgment stage 
of proceedings resulting in denial of Warren Yadon's motion for summary 
judgment. Second, the trial court incorrectly applied the law and burdens of proof 
at trial resulting in the clearly erroneous finding that the Kelleys had established 
the elements of a resulting trust. This Court should overturn the trial court's 
decisions, and enter summary judgment in favor of Warren Yadon, or in the 
alternative, enter an order quieting title to the Montgomery farm in the names of 
Warren and Kiln Yadon. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FOUND THATTHE 
KELLEYS FAILED TO ESTABLISH A GENUINE ISSUE OF 
FACT ON THEIR CLAIM OF RESULTING TRUST AT THE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
In response to Warren Yadon's motion for summary judgment, the Kelleys 
had the burden to come forward with facts sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
fact on their claiin of resulting trust. The Kelleys failed to establish any facts to 
create an issue of fact as to whether they had paid the purchase price or incurred - . .  . ~ " ~ 
an absolute obligation to pay for the Montgomery farm. The trial court 
erroneously denied Warren Yadon's motion for summary judgment, and Mr. 
Yadon now requests that this Court enter summary judgment in favor of the 
Yadons. "On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this 
Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the district court 
originally ruling on the motion." Chapin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 162 P.3d 772, 
774 (2007). 
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Warren Yadon established 
facts by affidavit that Warren and Kim Yadon owned the Montgomery farm in fee 
simple, and had paid the purchase price for the Montgomery farm as contained in. 
the recitals of the deeds to the property. R. Vol. 1, pgs. 149, 166 & 168. These 
facts, as contained in the affidavit of Warren Yadon, were sufficient to invoke the 
presumption under Idaho Law that the holder of legal title is the owner thereof. 
The burden of proof then shifted to the Kelleys to create a genuine issue of fact 
on each element of their claiin of resulting trust,.in order to rebut the presumption 
of ownership by the Yadons. 
A resulting trust can arise either (1) where title to property is transferred to 
one party, the trustee, although another party, the beneficiary of the trust, paid the 
purchase p r i ~ f o ~ t ~ ~ f p f ~ ~ ~ i ; t y ; o ' f ~ 2 ) ~ ~  ~~le~z~-f~~ et-6-~-r-O-P-ew~isSttannsfee~edddddd 
by gift or devise, with an apparent intent that the donee or devisee is to hold legal 
11 
title as a trustee in osder for the beneficiary of the trust to enjoy the beneficial 
interest in that property." Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 468,469,886 P.2d 772, 
775 (1 994); citing Russ Balkurd & Family Achievement Inst. v. Lava Hot Springs 
Resort, Inc., 97 Tdaho 572, 579, 548 P.2d 72, 79 (1976); see also Hawe v. Hawe, 
89 Tdaho 367,376,406 P.2d 106, 1 10 (1965). It has been said of a resulting trust 
that: 
it never arises out of a contract or agreement that is legally 
enforceable, but arises by implication of law from their acts and 
conduct apart: from any contract, the law implying a trust where the 
acts of the party to be charged as trustee have been such as are in 
honesty and fair dealing consistent only with a purpose to hold the 
praperty in trust, notwithstanding such party may never have agreed 
to the trust and may have really intended to resist it. 
Shepherdv. Dougan, 58 Idaho 543,553,76 P.2d 442,445 (1937). In addition, "as 
a general rule, a resulting trust arises only where such may reasonably be 
presumed to be the intention of the parties as determined from the facts and 
ciscurnsta~nces existing at the time of the transaction." Hawe, 89 Idaho at 109,406 
P.2d at 374 (emphasis supplied); citing Shurrum v. Watts, 80 f daho 44, 50, 324 
This Court should take particular note of the striking similarity of the facts 
---*- 
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from California, and hoped to purchase the DeHood Dairy, in Jerome County, but 
were unable to arrange financing for the purchase. Hettinga, 126 Idaho at 468, 
886 P.2d at 773. Mrs. Hettinga's parents (the Sybrandys) verbally agreed to 
purchase the dairy and lease the property to the Hettingas for a monthly payment 
equal to the payment due on the underlying land sale contract. Id. The Sybrandys 
purchased the property in their names. Id. At one point, the dairy was expanded 
by purchasing additional land, and that was accomplished by a loan in the name 
of the Sybrandys and title was vested in the Sybrandys. Id. The additional 
monthly payments were reimbursed by the Hettingas. Id. All of the personal 
property and livestock associated with the dairy operation was purchased by the 
Hettingas. Id. In 1991, Mrs. Hettinga filed for divorce from Mr. Hettinga, and 
Mr. Hettinga filed a complaint in district court against Mrs. Hettinga and the 
Sybrandys seeking a determination of the Hettingas' and the Sybrandys' interests 
in the dairy. Hettinga, 126 Idaho at 469,886 P.2d at 774. Mr. Hettinga's claims 
were that the relationship between the Hettingas and the Sybrandys created either 
a "resulting trust" or a "constructive trust", and that the Hettingas should be 
deemed to be the owners of the property despite the lack of a written conveyance 
of the property to them. Id. 
.~" 
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time of the "transaction." See, Shurrum, 80 Idaho at 50, 324 P.2d at 385. The 
"transaction" was a conveyance of the Montgomery Farm from Doc Flanders to 
the Yadons in two separate conveyances - the first in 1992 and the second in 
1994. R. Vol. 1, pgs. 166 & 168. 
This Court should overturn the trial court's denial of summary judgment 
because the Kelleys did not establish a genuine issue of fact as to an element of 
their claim -that they paid the purchase price for the Montgomery Farm. In order 
to establish a genuine issue of material fact that a "resulting trust" arose at the 
time of the transfer, plaintiffs had to set forth facts to create an issue of fact that 
they "paid the purchase price" for the Montgomery Farm. Hettinga, 126 Idaho at 
470, 886 P.2d at 775. The "purchase price7'refers to the monies or consideration 
that was delivered to Flanders in exchange for the Montgomery Fann. In 
Hettinga, the Court found that the person seeking to establish a resulting trust must 
either demonstrate that they paid the purchase price or "incurred an absolute 
obligation to pay for the property." Id. 
In his brief and affidavits, Warren Yadon established the chain of title 
which reveals that Commons Farm, Inc., owned the Montgomery Farm and 
conveyed it to Doc Flanders. The consideration paid to Commons Farms, Inc., by 
Flanders, was tfie asSUm~tionbTthE-F5KiiiiCrle%;tSerV1~~of-$ 117;OOO. 00;- 
R. Vol. 1, pg. 157. At that time, the Yadons transferred their option to purchase 
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to Doc Flanders, who came up with the financing to purchase the Montgomery 
Farm, and in return, deeded an undivided one-half interest in the farm back to the 
Yadons. R. Vol. 1, pg. 166. Two years later, the Yadons purchased Doc 
Flanders' remaining one-half interest in the Montgomery Farm with proceeds 
from a loan from Northwest Farm Credit Services. R. Vol. 1, pgs. 172 & 203. 
The Yadons obtained the loan in their names, delivered the consideration to 
Flanders, and in the process "incurred an absolute obligation" to make the loan 
payments and gave a mortgage to Northwest Farm Credit. R. Vol. 1, pg. 172. In 
so doing, the Yadons paid the "purchase price for the property"or "incurred an 
absolute obligation" to pay the purchase price. Hettinga, 126 Idaho at 470, 886 
P.2d at 775. 
In response to the motion for summary judgment, the Kelleys failed to 
establish facts sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact on a necessary element 
of their claim of resulting trust - i.e. that they "paid the purchase price" for the 
Montgomery Farm. In their memorandum plaintiffs argue generically, "if the 
court believes the evidence offered by the Plaintiffs then the court can come to 
one result and on the other hand if the court believes the evidence of Yadons it can 
- 
come to a different result." R . - V 0 r I - ~ ~ p g 7 Z 1 ~ 9 7 I r i i ~ ~ - i - f ~ n 3 o n r y  lt-W ;th 
parties have established by affidavit conflicting evidence that creates a genuine 
issue of fact. What evidence did the Kelleys provide on the issue of who paid the 
purchase price? The Kelleys cited portions of the deposition transcript of George 
Icelley wherein Mr. Kelley's attorney asked him: 
Q. And part of the deal was that, you know, they got the loan in 
their names and it was deeded to them, but you were going to 
make the payments, right? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And did you actually make the payments? 
A. Yes. 
R. Vol. 1, pg. 216. This evidence did not create an issue of fact, but only 
corroborated Warren Yadon's position that it was the Yadons who paid the 
purchase price with proceeds from a loan in their names. Regardless ofwho made 
the loan payments after the transaction was completed, the purchase price had 
been paid when the loan proceeds were delivered to Mr. Flanders. Therefore, this 
piece of evidence failed to create an issue of fact for trial. 
Plaintiffs also supplied the Court with testimony from Warren Yadon in 
opposition to summary judgment: 
Q. Okay. And you paid Flanders? 
A. Yes. 
Q. With your money? 
A. With money that we borrowed. 
- Q. Froin who? - 
A. The bank. 
. . . .  
Q. And so it was out of that money that you paid Flanders? 
A. Yes. 
R. Vol. 1, pg. 215. This testimony further corroborated and supported Warren 
Yadon's position, that the Yadons paid the purchase price for the Montgomery 
Farm with proceeds from a loan in their names. Again, this evidence did not 
create an issue of fact as to whether or not the Kelleys paid the purchase price. 
Plaintiffs also made the argument that "Kelley had the relationships with 
Flanders and Commons for which Kelleys then allowed those persons to deal with 
Yadons." R. Vol. 1, pg. 220. This allegation is not supported by any fact in the 
record. Even if it were, this alleged fact does not create an issue of fact as to any 
element required. Plaintiffs then go on to argue that "Yadon comes in and says 
'Oh, this is my property because there was a Lease."' R. Vol. I, pg. 220. First, 
this alleged quote from Warren Yadon, though it has been presented as a direct 
quote, did not appear in any portion of the deposition transcript of Warren Yadon 
on record with the trial court. It is a misrepresentation of Mr. Yadon's testimony, 
which is that he "acquired the farm" and then leased it to Mr. Kelley under a 
verbal agreement. R. Vol. 1, pg. 15 1. Second, this argument did not create a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether the Kelleys paid the purchase price. 
- 
The Kelleys then argued that Hettingaxo~s not support Warren WOE'S 
position, but instead, supports the Kelleys' position because "Kelley paid all of 
the payments and taxes." R. Vol. 1, pg. 222. Plaintiffs kept coming baclc to the 
same argument - that they paid the purchase price because they allegedly made 
the loan payments. However, there were no facts in the record to establish that the 
Kelleys paid the purchase price at the time of the transaction. 
Even assuming the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiffs and giving 
them the benefit of the doubt that it was their money that was used to pay the loan 
obligation, the contention that they paid the purchase price is simply untenable. 
It is axiomatic in the lending industry that a person who takes a loan is actually 
purchasing money from the lender, in exchange for an obligation to repay the loan 
wit11 interest. This Court has long held that a "purchase price7' for real property 
can be paid from "the proceeds of a loan." Lepel v. Lepel, 93 Idaho 82, 86, 456 
P.2d 249,253 (1969). The proper legal standard for the trial court to apply is that 
the purchase price was paid from the loan proceeds secured by the Yadons in 
1994. The reimbursement of loan payments by the Kelleys later on resulted froin 
a separate agreement related to the lease of the farm, and did not constitute 
payment of the purchase price. 
Because the trier of fact in this matter was the trial court, the judge did not 
- - ----- - - have to draw all inferences in favor of the non-movmg party, -tKZ ju3ge was 
allowed to consider the evidence presented and draw reasonable inferences as he 
saw fit based upon the evidence. See, Verbillis v, Dependable Appliance Company, 
107 Idaho 335,338,689 P.2d 227,230 (Ct. App. 1984). "The appliance store, in 
essence, has urged us to hypothecate a fact . . .. This we cannot do. Motions for 
su-lnn~ary judgment are decided upon the facts shown," Id. The only reasonable 
inference of fact in this matter was that Warren and Kim Yadon purchased the 
Montgomery Farm with proceeds from a loan obtained in their name, for which 
they had the absolute obligation to repay. There was no evidence provided by the 
Kelleys that the Ioan was not in the names of the Yadons. There was no evidence 
presented by the Kelleys that they somehow '"incurred an absolute obligation" to 
pay the purchase price. The trial court erred in finding that there was a genuine 
issue of fact as to whom had paid the purchase price. Further, Warren Yadon 
requests that this Court make a legal determination that the Kelleys did not incur 
an "absolute obligation" to pay the purchase price be making a verbal agreement 
to pay the Yadons' loan payments. 
This Court should overrule the trial court's denial of summary judgment, 
and grant Warren Yadon's motion for summary judgment and quiet title to the 
Montgomery farm in the names of Warren and Kiln Yadon. 
"-- "" ---- - -- - -- - - - - - -- --- - 
B. THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED THE LAW AND ITS 
FINDINGS WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS WITH REGARD TO 
THE IMPOSITION OF A RESULTING TRUST. 
The trial court misapplied the law of resulting trusts regarding the element 
of payment of the purchase price, and in addition, its findings of fact were clearly 
erroneous when it found that the Kelleys had actually reimbursed all of the loan 
payments made by the Yadons. 
1. The trial court improperlv found that the Kelleys' act of 
reimbursinr the loan pavments constituted "payment of the 
purchase price" under the theory of resultinp trust. 
In general the trial court held that "Idaho law presumes that the holder of 
title to real property is the legal owner of that property." Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 
Idaho 467,469, 886 P.2d 772,774 (1994); citing RUSS Ballard & Family 
Achievement Inst. v. Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc., 97 Idaho 572,579,548 P.2d 72, 
79 (1976). The Idaho statute of frauds requires that "all interests in real property 
must be accomplished through a writing, signed by the party granting the interest 
or that party's agent." Idaho Code 5 9-503. The trial court also correctly 
identified that " it is a rebuttable presumption that the holder of title to property 
is the legal owner of that property." See, Hettinga, 126 Idaho at 469, 886 P.2d at 
774. And that "the burden is on the party w h o ~ o p p ~ ~ s S t ~ ~ p ' " S U ~ i o ~ t o  
produce evidence to rebut the presumption." See, IRE 301. The trial court also 
held that "all interests in real property must be accomplished through a writing, 
signed by the party granting the interest or that party's agent." Idaho Code 5 9- 
503. Further, the trial court properly distinguished that "although a trust in real 
property can arise by implication or operation of law without such a writing, I.C. 
5 9-504, a person claiming ownership through such a trust must establish such 
claiin by evidence that is clear, satisfactory and convincing." See, Hettinga, 126 
Idaho at 469, 886 P.2d at 774. 
The legal argument relied upon by the Kelleys at trial - and ultimately 
adopted by the trial court - was that the Kelleys paid the purchase price for the 
Montgomery farm when they either directly paid or reimbursed the Yadons for all 
of the semi-annual loan payments due to Northwest Farm Credit (and subsequent 
lenders). R. Vol. 2, pg. 402. This conclusion is a (I)  misapplication of law 
coupled with a (2) clearly erroneous finding of fact. 
First, the trial court misapplied the law when it made a legal determination 
that the Kelleys' reiinburseinentlpayinent of the semi-annual loan payments rose 
to the level of "paying the purchase price." 
The case of Hettinga v. Sybvandy is of paramount importance to this case to 
-- -- 
determine what constitutes paymentOf ih-FpBase  price.IngFneral,-the-- 
purchase price is paid when consideration is supplied in exchange for property. 
Hettinga, 126 Idaho at 470,886. P.2d at 775; citingshurrum v. Watts, 80 Idaho 44, 
54, 324 P.2d 380, 386 (1958). In this matter, the trial court found that in 1992 
"the Yadons took a loan in their names and used the proceeds to buy a one-half 
interest in the property froin Flanders, who gave thein a quitclaim deed in 
exchange." R. Vo1.2, pg. 3. Curiously, in the next sentence, the trial court stated 
"the Yadons did not use any of their own money in this transaction." Id. This is 
an obvious contradiction, because a person who incurs a loan by written obligation 
"owns" the inoney that is given to them by the bank. Therefore, the Yadoils 
use their own money, money that they had borrowedpurchased from the bank. 
This is a critical misapplication of law by the trial court. 
The trial court then found that in 1994, "the Yadons took another loan and 
purchased Flanders' share in the farm, thereby becoming the sole title holders to 
the farm." R. Vol. 2, pg. 5. The Court's aclmowledgment of these facts should 
have ended the analysis of which party paid the purchase price, because at that 
time the purchase price had been delivered to Flanders by the Yadons in the form 
of money that the Yadons purchased from the bank. It is axiomatic in the lending 
industry that a person who takes a loan is actually purchasing inoney from the 
-- -- -. -- .- - -- - - 
lender, in exchange for an obligation to repay the loan with E r e i t .  -TEis-COuT 
has long held that a "purchase price" for real property can be paid from "the 
proceeds of a loan." Lepel v. Lepel, 93 Idaho 82, 86, 456 P.2d 249, 253 (1969) 
However, the trial court went on to find that the Kelleys agreed to an 
absolute obligation "to pay the Yadon's loans for the farm". R. Vol. 2, pg. 402. 
The trial court said that the existence of this "absolute obligation," which was not 
in writing, was credible and corroborated by Kim Yadon's testimony. R. Vol. 2, 
pg. 402. The trial court did not indicate which part of Kiln Yadon's testimony 
provided the "corroboration7' for that obligation. The trial court went on to say 
that evidence established that the Kelleys have performed the agreement. R. Vol. 
2, pg. 402. 
As to the issue of which party incurred an "absolute obligation" to pay the 
loan, the Yadons were the only parties who incurred a written obligation to re-pay 
the loan. The Yadons signed a promissory note to repay the loan and gave a 
mortgage to Northwest Farm Credit. Signing a promissory note and giving a 
mortgage is much more indicative of "incurring an absolute obligation" to re-pay 
the loan, than verbally agreeing to reimburse loan payments. The Kelleys did 
nothing to bind themselves in writing to make payments on the loan to either the 
bank or the Yadons. Th~~~nssWe~~th~Olrm~r'fiFs~61igat:ed-^oii-th~loan. 
If for any reason the loan were to have fallen into default, the Yadons were the 
ONLY parties on the hook for collection of that debt. Further, the trial court 
found that George Kelley "occasionally was late with a payment," and left the 
Yadons responsible to come up with the money out of their own pockets. R. Vol. 
2, pg. 397. Warren Yadon is requesting that this Court find, as a matter of law, 
that verbally agreeing to reimburse a loan payment does NOT.constitute "payment 
of the purchase price" or "incurring an absolute obligation" to pay the purchase 
price. 
The trial court held that "the mixing in and use of Kelley's personal assets 
as collateral for the loans taken by the Yadon's is strong evidence in support of 
the existence of the "obligation" to repay the loan." R. Vol. 2, pg. 401. However, 
the trial court did not cite to any exhibit or piece of testimony to support the claim 
that Kelley's personal assets were used as collateral on the loan. The trial court 
did indicate that in 2000, the "Yadons refinanced their loan with D.L. Evans 
Bank, which included the use of George Kelley's personal property farm and 
irrigation equipment located on the Montgomery farm as collateral security for the 
loan." R. Vol. 2, pg. 5. However, this finding was inaccurate. A close look at 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit "16" reveals that the equipment listed as security on the D.L. 
Evans Bank l ~ ~ ~ i ~ 2 ~ ~ ~ ~ h e S a m ~ ~ i p m e ~ t l i s f ~ ~ F n - P 1 ~ i ~ f ~ ~ i 6 i t i ' 6 ' ~ ~ - - ~ ~ ' ~ " - -  
which was the document transferring the option to purchase the Montgomery 
Farm in 1992. The equipment listed as security in 2000, was never owned by 
George Kelley, it came with the Montgomery Farm. 
Either way, the 2000 refinance should not have had any effect on the trial 
court's analysis of the "payment of the purchase price" because it happened six 
years after "the time of the transaction" which was in 1994. And, payment of the 
purchase price must be analyzed in connection with the facts in existence at the 
time of the transaction. Therefore, there is really no evidence in the record to 
substantiate the trial court's statement that Kelley's assets were used as collateral 
on the loans. The collateral on the loans was the farm and equipment that came 
with the farm. R. Plaintiffs Exhibit "16". 
The Hettinga decision is instructive on this issue. InHettinga, the dairy was 
purchased by the Sybrandys under a "land sale contract" and the purchase price 
was paid by the Sybrandys over time when they "paid all monthly escrow 
payments to the escrow holders." Id. In Hettinga, this Court operated under the 
assumption that the Sybrandys were the only parties who had "incurred an 
absolute obligation to pay the purchase price" presumably because the Hettinga's 
were not obligated oil the land sale contract. Even inHettinga, where the purchase 
- _ __-- _ . . -- price was not delivered up front at the tune oTclosing, ana insfeaa was being paid 
on a monthly installment basis, this Court still declined to impose a resulting trust 
where the Hettinga's were reimbursing the monthly installments to the Sybrandys. 
Therefore, it was a misapplication of law for the trial court to find that the 
Kelleys paid the purchase price for the Montgomery farm by entering into a verbal 
agreement to reimburse the Yadons for the loan payments. In the alternative, 
Warren Yadon requests that this Court make legal determination that a verbal 
agreement to repay a loan in some else's name does not rise to the level of 
"incurring an absolute obligntion" to pay the purchase price for the property. 
Second, the trial court was clearly erroneous in finding that the Kelleys 
actually reimbursed all of the semi-annual loan payments, and that there was an 
intention on the part of the Yadons to hold the Montgomery farm in trust for the 
ICelleys. The burden of proof was on the Kelleys to demonstrate those facts by 
clear and convincing evidence. One problem with the Kelleys' position, is that 
they never demonstrated when or under what circumstances the Montgomery fann 
would be returned to the Kelleys. In Hettinga, this Court held that there was no 
evidence that "in 1984 the parties agreed to when or under what terms the alleged 
buy-out would take place;" and that was a reason why the Court did not impose 
a result~ggtr~st~5~~~ti~1Z6~I-d~h~tittt47O;-886-P~2dd~tt7775~S-iimii1~r1y~in 
this matter there was a complete lack of evidence from the Kelleys as to "when 
or under what terms" the Montgomery farm would be re-conveyed to the Kelleys. 
There was certainly no evidence that the parties had reached an agreement on this 
issue at the time of the transaction in 1994. 
In fact there was evidence from the Kelley camp that they knew that if 
Warren and Kim Yadon got divorced the Montgomery farm would remain with 
the Yadons. For instance, evidence from Kitty Kelley - a clearly biased witness 
for the Kelleys - suggested that the Kelleys knew in 1994, that the Yadons were 
going to keep the farm if they divorced. She was testifying regarding the 
conversation between the Kelleys, Yadons, Kitty Kelley and Todd Phillips that 
occurred in Todd Phillips' office on the date that the Montgomery farm was 
signed over to the Yadons: 
What did you recall was said about the Montgomery place when you 
were at Mr. Phillips' office? 
Well, do you mean when we signed this agreement? 
Either when you signed or any other time. I'm just asking what 
conversations you recalled that were at Mr. Phillips' office? 
Well, just that we were signing it over and then that Dadwould get 
it back. 
Did you sign exhibit 6 in Mr. Phillips' office? 
Yes, I did. And then I remember a joke after they signed that they 
joked that if they got a divorce that they would get to keep it. 
He being your dad? Who would keep it? 
That Kim and Warren would assume it. 
-mtrfcln"tjceeep-it? - 
Would. 
Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 246,ll. 15-25; pg. 247,ll. 1-9. Considering this testimony, at best 
there was a clear understanding between the Kelleys and the Yadons at the time 
of the transaction that if Kim and Warren got divorced the Yadons would keep the 
Montgomery farm. At worst, there is significant confusion as to what the 
agreement was between the Kelleys and the Yadons at the time of the transaction, 
and there were never facts presented by the Kelleys regarding when and under 
what circumstances the farm would be returned to the Kelleys. For the trial court 
to make a finding that the evidence was clear and convincing that there was an 
intention on the part of the Yadons to hold the property in trust for the Kelleys is 
clearly erroneous. 
Overall, the facts from Hettinga v. Sybrandy bear a striking resemblance to 
the facts produced at trial in this matter, and in Hettinga this Court refused to 
impose a resulting trust. It was a misapplication of law and a clearly erroneous 
deviation from precedent for the trial court to find that the facts presented by the 
Kelleys constituted clear and convincing evidence to establish the elements of 
resulting trust. If this Court were to affirm the trial court's decision, it would 
place in jeopardy of loss every landlord's holdings wherein he is leasing the 
pmperty-"t~-~-t~iran'~o%asagreed-tu-p-ay ,zn-. m-ountcqurrltothea~~derl~ng-- 
mortgage payment and expenses (such as a triple-net lease). The tenant could at 
28 
a whim decide to claim that the landlord is simply holding the property in trust for 
him, and request an imposition of resulting trust. The requirement to demonstrate 
payment of the purchase price and/or incurring an absolute obligation to pay the 
purchase price by a party claiming imposition of a resulting trust provides 
protection to property owners from improper imposition of resulting trusts. It is 
imperative that this Court enforce that threshold requirement in this case. 
2. The burden of proof on the Kelleys' claim of result in^ trust 
was improperly placed upon Warren Yadon. 
The burden of proof at trial was upon the Kelleys to prove the elements of 
resulting trust by evidence that was "clear, satisfactory and convincing." See, 
Hettinga, 126 Idaho at 469, 886 P.2d at 774. The standard for "clear and 
convincing" proof requires more than a vacuum of evidence to the contrary. 
The trial court incorrectly shifted the burden of proof to Warren Yadon 
when it found "Warren testified that Kelley has not reimbursed the Yadons in full 
for payments they made, but presented no financial records or persuasive 
docuinentation to establish what payments the Yadons had made, the amounts of 
the payments, and no records were apparently kept to substantiate George 
Kelley's reimbursement payments to the Yadons." R. Vol. 2, pg. 397. Under the 
Kelleys own argument, the burden of proof was on the Kelleys to establish that 
they had paid the purchase price by reimbursing each and every semi-annual loan 
payment made by the Yadons. George Kelley testified that he paid all of the loan 
reimbursement payments to the Yadons, Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 100, 1. 13, and Warren 
Yadon testified that the Kelleys had not fully reimbursed the Yadons for loan 
payments. R. Vol. 2, pg. 328, 11. 20-25. In the face of that contradictory verbal 
testimony, the trial court improperly placed the burden upon Warren Yadon to 
come up with "persuasive documentation" to support his testimony. R. Vol. 2, pg. 
397. On the contrary, it was the Kelleys' burden to prove that they made all of the 
reiinburseinent payments to the Yadons by "clear and convincing evidence." 
Therefore, this Court should overturn the trial court's finding of fact on this issue, 
and enter a finding that the evidence is contradictory at best and that there is not 
clear and convincing evidence to support the Kelleys' position on their flawed 
argument that they paid the purchase price by reimbursing the Yadons for the 
semi-annual loan payments. 
Therefore, even if this Court were to accept the trial court's misapplication 
of law regarding the "payment of the purchase price" and find that the Kelleys' 
reimbursement of the loan payments to the Yadons constituted payment of the 
p~~r~~~~e-p~~c~;~~tkere-i-s-nut-c-~~~nd-m-~nci~~gevide.1~ce-i~he7:ec~rd-t~----- 
establish that the Kelleys reimbursed all of the loan payments to the Yadons. 
Thus, this Court should overturn the trial court's finding. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED WARREN 
UADON'S CLAIM FOR EVICTION. 
At trial, the court did not get to the issue of eviction. Warren Yadon 
requests that this Court overturn the trial court's decisions, and enter an order of 
eviction and quiet title in favor of the Yadons. 
Plaintiffs have leased the Montgomery Farm since it was purchased by the 
Yadons, without a written lease agreement. There was not an agreed upon term 
for the lease, and therefore, the plaintiffs are year-to-year tenants. The tenancy 
created by a lessor's election to continue a lease following its expiration is a 
tenancy at will. Lewiston Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Rohde, 110 Idaho 640, 718 
P.2d 551 (1985). "A tenancy or other estate at will, however created, may be 
terminated: (1) By the landlord's giving notice in writing to the tenant, in the 
manner prescribed by the code of civil procedure, to remove from the premises 
within a prescribed period of not less than one (1) month, to be specified in the 
notice . . .." See, Idaho Code 5 55-208. "After such notice has been served, and 
the period specified by such notice has expired, but not before, the landlord may 
-- -- 
reenter, or proceed according to law to recover possession." See, Idaho Code 5 55- 
209. 
In this matter, the Kelleys were personally served with an eviction notice 
on September 8,2008. R. Vol. I ,  pg. 15 1. More than thirty (30) days have passed 
since Kelleys were served with the eviction notice. Therefore, there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact on the claim for eviction and this Court should enter 
judgment on Warren Yadon's claim of eviction. 
VII. ATTORNEY FEES 
Warren Yadon is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs as a 
prevailing party on appeal pursuant to I.C. 5 12-121; and I.C. 5 6-324. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Warren Yadon respectfully requests that this Court overturn the trial court's 
decision denying Warren Yadon's motion for summary judgment and enter an 
appropriate order granting the same. In the alternative, Warren Yadon requests 
that this Court find as a matter of law that the Kelleys did not incur an "absolute 
obligation" to pay the purchase price for the Montgomery farm by verbally 
agreeing to pay the Yadoiis' loan payments, and as such, have failed to establish 
-elments& r e ~ ~ 1 t & g - t 1 u s t ~ W a f ~ ~ e ~ - a d ' o n - f ~ r t h ~ r - r e - g u ~ s ~ t h a ~ t P l i S e - o m : ~  
enter an order of eviction against the Kelleys. Finally, Warren Yadon requests 
that this Court overturn the trial court's award of attorney fees, and enter an award 
of costs and fees to Warren Yadon, 
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